This paper examines the degree of interdependence between national stock market returns for 17 advanced economies and the United States for various sub-periods from January 1973 to February 2009. The examination is based on time-series techniques including both single equation (ordinary least squares and generalized method of moments) and system approaches (structural vector autoregressive process). We find an increasing degree of interdependence between national stock market returns over time as well as spillover effects from a shock to U.S. stock market returns to the advanced economies. The main focus of our paper is to examine interdependence and spillover effects for the pre-and post-turmoil periods that characterize the recent U.S. financial crisis. Our findings indicate that the degree of interdependence and spillover effects were greatest after the emergence of the U.S. subprime mortgage meltdown in the summer of 2007, and even more so after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The empirical results indicate varying degrees of interdependence and spillover effects between the different advanced countries and the United States in the earlier decades. However, the results become fairly uniform across all the countries after the emergence of the U.S. financial crisis.
Introduction
The collapse of U.S. housing prices and the ensuring mortgage market meltdown that began during the summer of 2007 triggered a global financial crisis. Unlike the financial crises that struck Southeast Asian countries in the summer of 1997, the more recent crisis initially started in one of the most advanced countries in the world, namely the United States. As a result of this crisis, there is widespread interest in understanding the extent to which the increasing interdependencies in trade and financial linkages among countries in recent years contributed to spillover effects from the United States to other countries.
There is ample factual evidence that national markets have become more inter-connected with one another with respect to cross-border trade and capital flows during the past few decades (e.g., see Forbes and Chinn, 2004) . It seems reasonable to assume that these cross-border market linkages have increased the likelihood for shocks in an economically and financially important country to be transmitted internationally. This would particularly be the case as regards a country like the United States. One would hence expect sizable spillovers from the recent and severe U.S. financial crisis to other countries given the overall importance of the United States for the world's economy and financial markets. There is, however, as yet no or limited empirical evidence supporting such a contention as regards this particular crisis. But there are studies involving earlier time periods, which include some disruptive episodes. For example, in an examination of German and U.S. stock markets during 1980 -2002 , Bonfiglioli and Favero (2005 do not find any evidence of a co-movement or interdependence in stock market returns between these two economies in the long run. However, they do find that returns in these two markets do tend to move together during periods of turmoil. Also, in a more comprehensive study, Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005) examine the degree of regional and global integration using stock market returns in 22 countries during 1980-1998. They find that the degree of integration of stock returns in these countries is not as great as was generally thought at the time.
The most recent financial crisis in the United States, the worst since the Great Depression, provides a good opportunity to reassess the degree to which any interdependencies among stock market returns in different countries that existed may have changed over time, and especially prior to, during, and after various events characterizing the crisis. Our reassessment is based on an examination of the degree of co-movement between national stock market returns in 17, and in some cases 14, advanced economies and the United States from January 1973 to February
2009.
To assess the degree of co-movement, one might simply proceed by producing various scatter plots of stock returns for each of the countries and the United States for each decade, some of which are shown in Figure 1 . Based on this approach, there appears to be evidence of higher positive correlations and thus increased interdependence over time, especially during the decade of the 2000s. No strong conclusions can be reached, however, until the evidence provided by these plots is confirmed with more formal time series techniques to determine whether there has indeed been a significant increase in the co-movement of stock market returns across national borders. Such techniques are also appropriate to assess whether there have been significant spillover effects from the United States to other developed countries. Pursuing this more rigorous approach in turn may help provide information about the reasons the current crisis has been a truly global one and therefore may eventually last longer than would have been the case without an increased interdependence among countries. In this regard, we carefully examine the pre-and post-turmoil periods using the emergence of the U.S. financial crisis in August 2007 and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 as dating or cut-off points for detecting spillover effects from the United States to other parts of the world.
[ Figure 1 here] Although there have been many previous empirical studies analyzing the degree of comovement in stock market returns across countries, the methodologies employed in those most closely related to our study have some limitations, as will be discussed below. We attempt to address these limitations by comparing the results from both a single equation and system approach in our examination of national stock market return co-movements. In the single equation approach, we provide results for both ordinary least squares (OLS) and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimations. We find that the results from these two methods yield somewhat different results, with those from the OLS estimation being less reliable. In the system approach, we use a structural vector autoregressive process (SVAR) to capture the contemporaneous and dynamic responses of stock returns in other countries to a shock in U. S. stock returns. This methodology is superior to the reduced-form VAR employed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) because it allows one to identify structural idiosyncratic shocks given appropriate identifying assumptions.
Based upon our empirical results, we find evidence of varying degrees of interdependence in stock market returns between the various countries in our sample and the United States over time. In general, however, the degree of stock market interdependence between the many of the advanced economies in our sample and the United States remained relatively low during the 1970s and 1980s but then increased during the 1990s. In addition, the impulse-response analysis shows that both the short-and long-run responses or spillover effects of many of these advanced countries' national stock returns to a shock in U.S. stock returns are significant and largest during the 2000s. Although there is no complete uniformity in results for each and every country over time, there nonetheless has been a change in the degree of interdependence between the different countries and the United States over time.
Focusing more specifically on the period of the recent crisis, we expect that foreign stock returns in those countries with the highest degrees of interdependencies will have the strongest spillover effects to movements in U.S. stock returns after both the emergence of the U.S. We do find that for all of the 17 advanced economies in our sample there is a greater degree of their stock market return co-movements with U.S. stock market returns after the emerging crisis in August 2007. In the case of Japan, however, even though its stock market returns became more interdependent with U.S. market returns during the 2000s, as compared to the other advanced countries, Japanese returns display the least degree of co-movement and smallest response to short and long run stock return shocks originating in the United States. Furthermore, the short-run impulse responses or spillover effects of the different national stock returns to a shock in U.S. returns after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers are greater in all countries in our sample, except Japan and Switzerland.
The next section presents several stylized facts to demonstrate the increasing interconnectedness between the advanced countries in our sample and the United States. It also provides a brief review of related literature regarding the co-movement of stock market returns among countries. Section 3 presents our empirical model and discusses the estimation techniques employed, while Section 4 describes the data and presents the empirical results. Some concluding remarks are reported in the last section.
Growing interdependencies between advanced economies and the United States
What makes the current global crisis different from previous financial crises is not only its severity but that the severity is in large part due to the United States. The reason is that, as Table 1 shows, U.S. GDP is slightly more than one-fifth of the world total and U.S. stock market capitalization is about one-third of world market capitalization. The United States is also the largest importer in the world (Table 1) . This means that a decline in U.S. GDP and U.S. stock market capitalization can adversely affect other countries through various trade and financial linkages. Similar data for the other 17 countries in our sample are presented for comparative purposes.
[ Table 1 here]
To elaborate on the potential channels through which U.S. shocks may have spread to other economies, Tables 2 and 3 provide a few stylized facts regarding trade and capital flow linkages between the United States and the other advanced economies in our sample. This type of data is important because the spread of a financial crisis globally may occur or worsen because an adverse shock in one large country can be transmitted internationally through various channels involving import/export markets and capital markets as well as through changes in exchange rates and commodity prices (see, for example, Hernández and Valdés, 2001 , Imbs, 2004 , Ehrmann, Fratzscher, and Rigobon, 2005 , Bayoumi and Swiston, 2008 . Of course, the magnitude of the effect of a shock will depend to a large degree on the strength of linkages between countries.
Pursuing this line of reasoning, Table 2 shows that trade linkages between the U.S. and our other advanced economies has changed over time. As may be seen, on average both the shares of their total exports and imports to the United States have slightly decreased over time.
According to the International Monetary Fund (2007), the general and slight decrease in the importance of trade among many countries with the United States is due to rapid growth in intraregional trade. In addition, the United States now trades more with emerging market economies and other developing countries, and to a lesser extent with Japan and the Euro area countries.
[ Table 2 here] Table 3 provides some limited information on cross-border financial flows between our 17 countries and the United States. These data show the degree to which each of our sample countries has portfolio investment in the United States as well as the importance of U.S. portfolio investment for each of these countries. These data are somewhat similar in pattern to the trade data discussed earlier insofar as there has been a slight decrease in such financial flows from 2001 to 2007 (earlier bilateral portfolio investment on a yearly basis are not available) .
[ Table 3 here] Despite the slight decline in the trade and financial linkages, the co-movement of stock returns between our other sample economies and the United States appear to have been substantially increasing since the 1970s (see Figure 1) . 1 This pattern suggests that stock market linkages may be an appropriate channel to focus on in examining the transmission of shocks associated with the collapse of the U.S. mortgage and credit markets and corresponding spillover effects to other countries around the world. 2 The main reason is that stock prices reflect to a large degree future economic growth in countries and therefore disruptions in credit markets can 1 The scatter plots are quite similar for the other countries in our sample. 2 The channels through which a crisis spreads are different for different crisis episodes. Hernández and Valdés (2001) , for example, find that the trade linkage is the important transmission channel during the Thailand and Brazilian crises, whereas financial competition is the only relevant channel in the case of the Russian crisis.
adversely affect trade, financial flows and more broadly economic growth and employment.
These developments, in turn, can be contemporaneously incorporated in stock prices. Indeed, this has been the case with the 2007-2008 global crisis, with world trade having declined and recessions have occurred in many countries, and stock prices and returns also having declined from their highs in earlier years. We therefore focus our study on stock market returns as a broad measure to assess interdependencies among the United States and other countries with well established stock markets.
There have been many empirical studies testing the extent to which there are comovements in asset prices across countries. These tests have been utilized to examine stock market interdependence, financial market integration, the transmission of shocks across national borders, and financial contagion. An influential study by King and Wadhwani (1990) , for example, examines whether there has been a change in correlation coefficients between Japan, U.K., and U.S. stock returns before and after the stock market crash of 1987. They find a significant increase in the coefficients after the crash. It is argued by them that stock market returns fell jointly together after the crash because the private information set contains both idiosyncratic and systematic components. Bertero and Mayer (1990) and Lee and Kim (1993) Based on these studies, among others, it becomes clear that financial integration, comovements or interdependence and contagion are distinctly used terms. However, the comovement or interdependence of stock market returns is a necessary, if not a sufficient condition, for the occurrence of contagion. In the next sections, we implement a formal empirical investigation to examine the interdependence between 17 national stock market returns and U.S.
stock market returns, focusing most importantly on the two identifying sub-periods of the U.S.
crisis. In the latter case, we also examine whether there are stronger spillover effects from the United States to the other countries in the post-crisis periods. 
where Σ is the variance-covariance matrix. The VAR model (3) can be represented by the following moving average representation:
is the contemporaneous or shortrun response matrix. We employ Sims' (1980) method to just-identify the system of equations (4) by assuming that C is a lower-triangular matrix, that is,
where P is the Choleski decomposition factor. Note that the short-run response ( S ψ ) of the level variable
The univariate approach is used to test for the degree of interdependence and comovement, whereas the system approach is used to assess the magnitude of any spillover effects that might exist.
Empirical results
In examining the interdependence of stock market returns between various countries and Tables 4-7 report the results of our assessment of whether there have been changes in the degree of interdependence of monthly national stock market returns over time between the 14 sample countries and the United States using both single equation and system approaches. 7 In Tables 8-11 , we report similar results but for changes in the co-movements of weekly national stock market returns during the most recent decade, focusing on the pre-and post-periods associated with the U.S. financial crisis. There are two post-crisis periods we examine. The first period is the emergence of the subprime mortgage market meltdown taken to be the first week of August 2007 (Barth et al., 2009b) . We also consider the third week of September 2008 as an alternative start date when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. In both cases, the pre-turmoil period starts the first week of 2000 and the post-period begins the same week as the occurrence of the two events.
Based on the results reported in Tables 4-7 (Tables 4 and 6 ). The evidence of stock market return interdependence during the earlier decades of the 1970s through the 1990s is mixed, depending on which estimation technique is employed. The coefficients from the OLS estimation (Table 4) are significant in nearly all cases and do not vary much over time, whereas the coefficients from the GMM estimation are generally insignificant, particularly for the 1970s and 1980s (Table 6 ). However, the GMM coefficients do become significant in many countries in the 1990s and significant in all sample countries in the 2000s. The results for the OLS estimation suggest that stock markets always been interdependent since the early of 1970s, which contradicts a general belief that the extent of market linkages has been increasing over time. We believe that the GMM estimates, which support this general belief, are more reliable for several reasons. First, the GMM estimates are more consistent with the scatter plots of monthly stock market returns in Figure 1 , which exhibit weak correlations between the market returns in the earlier decades. Second, the OLS estimator is not even unbiased and is inconsistent when the exogeneity assumption is violated. Our informal test shows that this is indeed the case.
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Third, the J-specification test statistics for the over-identifying restrictions proposed by Hansen (1982) indicate that the model specification from the GMM estimations reported in Tables 5-6 is good.
[ Tables 4-6 here]
In sum, we find an increasing degree of stock market return interdependence between other advanced economies and the United States over time. For many of these countries, the increase in interdependence became particularly evident during and after the 1990s. An interesting result based on the GMM estimation in Tables 5-6 is that the change over time in stock market return interdependence for the individual countries is reasonably uniform. In particular, the increased co-movement of stock market returns with the United States in the 2000s compared to the 1990s is clearly observed for the smaller advanced economies as measured by GDP and market capitalization (Table 1) . Specifically, the coefficients in the 2000s become somewhat larger and statistically significant for Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, and Switzerland.
For the larger advanced economies, Canada and Japan both clearly share a similar pattern in that there is greater stock market return interdependence in the 2000s relative to the 1990s. In the case of France, Germany, and U.K., they do not display a similar increase in interdependence 8 We regressed over the period based on their slightly smaller coefficients. However, when taking into account the much smaller standard errors associated with these coefficients indicate sharper estimates, one may conclude that for these countries to there has been an increase in interdependence. The latter three countries also have relatively high degrees of interdependence as compared to the other countries during the 1990s. Hong Kong and Singapore share a similar pattern to these three larger countries. In sum, even though for a limited number of countries there were high degrees on interdependence in the earlier decades, it seems obvious that stronger degrees of interdependence in the 2000s were virtually everywhere in terms of either larger coefficients or smaller standard errors.
Our results on interdependence are not fully consistent with those reported by Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang (forthcoming) and Morona and Beltratti (2008) , who find that the comovement of stock market returns have increased only among selected countries, not all. suggest that investors may still benefit from portfolio diversification when diversifying across a geographically diverse group of countries. The differences in some of the findings may be due a greater degree of interdependence among countries that occurred during the recent crisis, something that the other two studies could not have taken into account given when they were completed.
Turning to the issue of spillover effects, we can now compare the response of national stock returns for other countries to a U.S. return shock for the 2000s relative to that in earlier decades. Both the short-run and long-run responses in all markets to such a shock are substantially larger and at least significant at the 10% level in the 2000s. The long-run responses, however, are less significant and much smaller in earlier decades (Table 7) . To elaborate, a 1% negative shock originating from the United States occurring in the 2000s leads to a drop in German stock returns by 1.2% in the short run. The initial negative shock that affects German stock returns continues, yielding a 1.8% decline in the long run. In the 1990s, in contrast, the response of German stock returns is 0.7% in the short run, and an even smaller 0.5% in the long run ( Figure 2 and Table 7 ).
[ Table 7 here]
[ Figure 2 here] Given the evidence presented above of a higher degree of stock market return interdependence between our sample countries and the United States in the 2000s, we now investigate specifically whether there has been a change in the pre-and post-U.S. financial crisis degree of interdependence using weekly data. If there has been an increase in interdependence, this would plausibly be an indication that the U.S. crisis spilled over substantially more to other advanced economies. In addition to examining interdependence, we estimated the spillover effects from a shock to U.S. stock market returns to our other sample countries. The interdependence results are based on the univariate approach using the GMM estimators and reported in Tables 8 and 10 . The spillover effects are based on the system approach using the coefficients of impulse responses from a VAR model and are reported in Tables 9 and 11.   Tables 8 and 9 refer to the first way used to identify the pre-and post-crisis periods (emerging crisis), while Tables 10 and 11 refer to the second way (Lehman Brothers failure), as discussed earlier.
The results in Table 8 show that the coefficients for the co-movement of stock returns during the post-emerging crisis period substantially increase for all but two countries compared to the pre-emerging crisis period in terms of both magnitude and significance. The exceptions are the results for Germany and Japan, with Germany becoming somewhat less interdependent with the United States and the co-movement between stock returns in Japan and the United States becoming significantly negative. As Table 10 The results from the impulse response analysis confirm that there are spillover effects from U.S. stock market returns to the stock market returns of the other advanced countries when the financial crisis emerged in the United States (Table 9 ). For example, a 1% drop in U.S. stock returns is associated with a 1.05% short run decline and a 1.28% long run decline in U.K. stock returns. Before the crisis emerged, the magnitude of the spillover effect from a U.S. shock is smaller; a 1% drop in U.S. stock returns is associated with a 0.71% contemporaneous decline in U.K. stock market returns and to a somewhat smaller 0.59% decline in the long run. A similar pattern holds for the other countries.
[ Tables 8 and 9 here] Following Lehman Brothers' collapse, although the GMM estimations do not indicate a pattern of large increases in the co-movement of stock returns for the 17 sample countries and the United States (Table 9) , the impulse response analysis in Table 11 indicates almost always larger spillover effects than in the pre-crisis period. In particular, the magnitude of both short and long run national stock return responses to a shock in U.S. stock returns is larger after the failure of Lehman Brothers in all sample countries, except Japan. In addition, the contemporaneous responses in countries to a U.S. shock are also higher during the post-Lehman Brothers failure than the post-emerging crisis period, except in the cases of Japan and Switzerland. These results suggest that the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers contributed the most to spreading the crisis worldwide. Frank and Heiko (2009) and Dooley and Hutchison (forthcoming) also find that the collapse of Lehman Brothers triggered the global financial crisis. Their sample, unlike ours, focuses mainly on emerging market economies, however.
[ Tables 10 and 11 here] 
Conclusion
We generally find an increase in interdependence between national stock market returns over time as well as spillover effects from a shock to U.S. stock returns to other advanced countries. Furthermore, we also find that the results are reasonably uniform for countries, both with respect to interdependence and spillover effects. Most importantly, given the focus of our paper, we find that spillover effects from the United States to other industrial countries were greatest after the emergence of the U.S. subprime mortgage market meltdown in the summer of 2007, especially after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
Our results as well as those of others raise the issue of the underlying reason that the degree of stock return interdependence among the countries with the United States increased and the spillover effects became greater after as compared to before the U.S. financial crisis. Some possible explanations for the changing pattern and magnitude in the co-movement of national stock market returns are as follows. First, the current global crisis was triggered in the United States, which has the largest economy and the biggest financial markets in the world. In estimating and comparing the output spillover effects of shocks from the United States, the Euro area and Japan to other parts of the world, Bayoumi and Swiston (2008) find that the largest spillovers originated in the United States. They also find that financial linkages are the most important channel in transmitting shocks between the countries. Second, countries are now affected to a greater extent by global shocks than before, and to a lesser extent by countryspecific shocks. As Forbes and Chinn (2004) Third, the concern over counterparty risk reached a record high during the tumultuous period.
This contributed to a liquidity freeze, credit crunch and flight to safety in so far as heightened uncertainty and loss of confidence undermined the proper functioning of the global financial system (Barth, Li and Phumiwasana, 2009 ).
The bottom line is that much more work remains to be done to better assess the basic factors that can explain the degree to which a change in interdependence among countries and a change in the magnitude of spillover effects from one country to others contributed to the severity and global nature of the recent crisis. This is essential to better assist policymakers in promoting greater regulatory responsibility for mitigating, if not eliminating, the likelihood of another systemic financial crisis. 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2008 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2008 1980-1989 1990-1999 iii) The quadratic spectral kernel with automatic bandwidth selection method is used to adjust standard errors. iv) The set of instruments includes 4 lags of national stock returns and U.S. stock returns. v) J refers to the over-identifying restrictions test statistic by Hansen (1982) and pv denotes associated p-values. vi) * indicates a 5% significance level. Table 7 . National stock return responses to a 1% U.S. stock return shock: monthly returns 
The 90% confidence intervals (C.I.) were obtained by taking 5% and 95% percentiles from 10,000 nonparametric bootstrap simulations for each country. Table 9 . National stock return responses to a 1% U.S. stock return shock: Emerging U.S. crisis episode . vi) The 90% confidence intervals (C.I.) were obtained by taking 5% and 95% percentiles from 10,000 nonparametric bootstrap simulations for each country. . vi) The 90% confidence intervals (C.I.) were obtained by taking 5% and 95% percentiles from 10,000 nonparametric bootstrap simulations for each country.
